The Four-Year Gap That Killed ₹200 Crore In IP Value: How Mirzapur's Creators Got Nothing While Prime Video Got Everything

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Here's what 45 months of silence did to Mirzapur's value:

The math is brutal. Shows that release annually (like The Family Man, Panchayat) see 17-20% viewership drops between seasons. 

Squid Game Season 2 pulled 192.6 million global views versus Season 1's 265 million. Severance Season 1 got more streams in 2025 than its 2022 launch. The difference is that severance built anticipation. Squid Game waited too long.

Mirzapur fell into the death spiral category.

Fan comments captured it perfectly: "Pehle k 2 season ka kuch bhi yaad nayi raha ab" (Can't remember anything from the first two seasons now).

When your audience can't remember your plot, you're not building a franchise - you're starting from scratch each time.

While viewership collapsed, production costs exploded. The numbers tell the story:

That's an 8x cost increase. For 18% less peak viewership than Season 2.

Why the explosion? 

Ali Fazal (Guddu), Pankaj Tripathi (Kaleen Bhaiya), and the ensemble cast commanded star salaries after Season 2's success. The four-year gap meant renegotiations and everyone got paid.

Except the people who created the IP.

Netflix cancels shows when viewership falls 40%+ between seasons. Prime Video follows similar math. Mirzapur Season 3's Week 3 collapse (84% down from opening) puts Season 4 in serious jeopardy despite the announcement.

Strong IPs generate sequel rights, format sales, merchandising, international remakes. Weak performance caps all of these. Mirzapur's theatrical film announced for 2026? Now facing questions about whether audiences still care.

The devastating math: Production costs up 8x. Viewership sustainability down 84%. That's not a hit show… that's a liability.

And Excel Entertainment likely captured none of the upside that made those inflated costs justifiable.

Now for the part that makes Squid Game's exploitation look generous.

Squid Game cost $21.4 million to produce Generated $900 million in "impact value" for Netflix Creator Hwang Dong-hyuk received: Zero residuals, zero IP ownership, flat fee only His quote: "I'm not that rich. But I have enough to put food on the table. Netflix paid me according to the original contract."

Result: Dong-hyuk had to return for Season 2 just to get compensated for Season 1's success. He forfeited all intellectual property rights. Every dollar of that $900 million went to Netflix.

Indian web series operate under the same model - except murkier and with even less transparency.

Industry-reported budgets for Prime Video originals: 

Mirzapur's estimated economics: 

Excel Entertainment (Farhan Akhtar and Ritesh Sidhwani's production house) operates on a licensing model. Here's how it works:

Translation: Even though Mirzapur Season 2 became the third most-watched show in Indian OTT history, Excel Entertainment received exactly what the contract specified—nothing more.

Every subscriber who joined Prime Video specifically for Mirzapur? That value accrued entirely to Amazon.

Successful broadcast shows generated ongoing revenue through:

Streaming obliterated these revenue streams while offering nothing comparable in return.

The brutal irony: Mirzapur's success likely helped Amazon sign up millions of Prime subscribers at ₹1,499/year. Season 2 was watched in 98% of India's postal codes during its opening weekend. That's a subscription driver worth hundreds of crores in recurring revenue.

Excel Entertainment saw none of it.

Here's where the knife really twists.

Indian IP has proven international format potential. The Malayalam film Drishyam sold remakes across multiple markets:

That's real money from a single IP and the original creators captured most of it because they retained format rights.

Web series should follow the same model. Netflix's Class (an Indian remake of the Spanish hit Elite) proves format licensing works across borders. American crime dramas get remade in Korea. Korean thrillers get remade in Hollywood. Format rights are a proven revenue stream.

A crime family saga set in India's Heartland Belt, mixing political corruption, gun-running, and family drama, could sell to:

Conservative estimate: ₹20-30 crore in total format licensing across 3-5 territories.

What Excel Entertainment likely received in format provisions: ₹0.

Under Indian Copyright Act (1957, amended 2012): Section 17: Producer is "first owner" of cinematographic work Section 14: Copyright holder has exclusive adaptation/distribution rights

In theory, Excel Entertainment should control Mirzapur's remake rights.

In practice, Prime Video contracts typically demand:

What this means: If a Korean or American studio wants to remake Mirzapur, they negotiate with Amazon Prime Video, not Excel Entertainment.

Any format fee flows to Amazon first. Excel might get a backend cut if their contract includes such provisions (most don't).

Squid Game generated:

Netflix owns all of this because Hwang Dong-hyuk "forfeited all intellectual property rights."

He gets nothing from any of it.

Indian creators face the same structure, except with even less contractual sophistication. Korean creators are now demanding (and sometimes getting) profit participation in post-2023 contracts. Indian creators lag 3-5 years behind.

Mirzapur's format could realistically generate ₹20-30 crore across international territories. Excel Entertainment's share under standard Prime Video contracts: likely zero, or minimal "if-and-when" backend tied to deals Prime Video may never pursue.

That's the cost of not owning your IP.

The delay wasn't just creative perfectionism. Three factors destroyed Mirzapur's momentum:

COVID-19 Pandemic: Post-production work halted completely when India went into lockdown. Season 2 finished shooting in October 2019, was scheduled for March 2020 release, got pushed to October 2020. That's the first delay.

Production Complexity: Season 3 required ambitious scope increases:

Script and Story Development: Principal photography for Season 3 began in April 2022. That's 18 months after Season 2's release. The shooting wrapped in mid-2023. Post-production took another year.

The pattern: shows that maintain 18-24 month release cycles (The Family Man, Panchayat) build sustainable franchises. Shows that wait 3-4 years gamble that audiences will remember—and care.

Mirzapur lost that gamble.

Broadcast TV shared risk and reward. Hit shows generated residuals for everyone involved. The network, the production company, the creators—everyone won together.

Streaming concentrates all upside with platforms while creators bear all reputational risk.

When Mirzapur Season 3 underperformed, Excel Entertainment's brand took the hit. Reviews called it "disappointing," "trash," "boring." Pankaj Tripathi's performance was criticized for lacking presence. The show's cultural cachet diminished.

Prime Video's subscribers got their content. No refunds issued. No harm to Amazon's brand. The platform moves on to the next property.

The risk-reward asymmetry is staggering.

Indian creators haven't fought for the contractual protections that Western creators (post-WGA strike) now demand as baseline:

What's Missing From Indian Streaming Contracts:

The result is that Indian production houses operate as work-for-hire contractors rather than IP owners, even when creating original content.

Cultural Power Without Economic Power = Exploitation

Mirzapur created cultural icons:

Who captured that cultural value?

After getting nothing from Season 1's $900 million impact, Hwang Dong-hyuk became an advocate for legal reform. He testified before South Korea's National Assembly supporting bills mandating residual payments.

His statement: "In order for there to be the next 'Squid Game' or the next 'Parasite,' the livelihoods of creators must be ensured."

Korean creators organized. They demanded better terms. They got them (at least partially).

Indian creators are largely silent. No comparable legislative push exists. No guild negotiations demand streaming residuals. No high-profile producers are leveraging hit shows into contractual reforms.

Without correcting this power imbalance, India's streaming boom becomes a content factory where platforms extract maximum value while creators struggle to reinvest in next projects.

The talent drain accelerates. Top creators leave for Hollywood or Korean productions that offer backend participation. The best IPs get developed elsewhere. Indian streaming becomes a feeder system for other markets' profit engines.

If you're a production house considering streaming deals, here's what you think you're getting versus reality:

What You Think You're Getting: Production financing from the platform Global distribution reach Brand association with major streamer

What You're Actually Trading Away: All backend upside from viewership success Format licensing revenue (₹20-30 crore potential) Residual income from catalog value Negotiating leverage for future seasons

The Mirzapur lesson: Even massive hits may not generate sustainable creator income under current streaming contracts.

Excel Entertainment spent ₹120-160 crore producing Season 3. They watched viewership collapse 84% within three weeks. They captured none of the format rights value. They received no residuals from Season 2's historic performance.

Strategic Alternatives (What You Should Negotiate):

The Current Reality:

The streaming model as currently structured in India is unsustainable for creators. It concentrates risk (production failure) and reward (viewership success) asymmetrically in favor of platforms.

Until Indian production houses organize collectively to demand:

...they'll continue operating as subcontractors rather than partners in the streaming economy they're building.

This week's spotlight: The $30,000 page that changed Marvel's economics

The Book:

Amazing Spider-Man #129 (February 1974) introduced Frank Castle, aka The Punisher - Marvel's most successful character launch of the 1970s.

Creators: Gerry Conway (writer), Ross Andru (pencils), Frank Giacoia (inks) Original cover price: 20 cents Current value: $15,000-$25,000 (CGC 9.2-9.4)

The Creation Story:

Gerry Conway created The Punisher as a throwaway Spider-Man villain - a vigilante hired by the Jackal to kill Spider-Man. The character was supposed to appear once and disappear.

Instead, The Punisher became one of Marvel's most profitable franchises:

What Gerry Conway received for creating The Punisher: His standard page rate. Approximately $35 per page in 1973.

Total compensation for creating a multi-hundred-million-dollar IP: ~$700.

The Original Art:

Ross Andru's original art pages from Amazing Spider-Man #129 are among the most valuable Marvel pages from the 1970s.

Last known sale: Page 19 (Punisher's reveal) sold for $27,500 in 2019.

Full issue page estimates today: Cover art: $100,000+ (if it exists) Page 19 (first Punisher appearance): $30,000-$40,000 Interior pages: $8,000-$15,000 each

The Work-For-Hire Problem:

Marvel's contracts in the 1970s were standard work-for-hire: creators received page rates, Marvel owned everything else.

When The Punisher became a franchise, Marvel captured 100% of the value:

Conway and Andru got nothing beyond their original page rates.

Why This Comic Matters:

Amazing Spider-Man #129 represents the moment Marvel's work-for-hire model proved catastrophically unfair to creators.

A character created for $700 generated hundreds of millions in revenue. The creator got nothing.

Fifty years later, streaming platforms use the same structure. A show created for ₹24 crore generates hundreds of crores in subscription value. The creators get nothing beyond their flat fee.

The Punisher proved the system was broken in 1974.
Mirzapur proves it's still broken in 2024.

Current Market: 

We've just released a comprehensive report on investment in content IP and how strategic IP acquisition can 4x your investment when platforms and creators don't understand what they're sitting on.

While streaming platforms leave ₹20-30 crore in format rights on the table and creators sign away backend participation, smart investors are buying undervalued IP at creator-level prices and monetizing it at platform-level scale.

Get the full report with your referral code below.